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UilDERSTAt{DIllG NOUIilAL AIICHOR.: A CASE STUDY
OF THE CENTRAT BANK OF NIGERH
BY
A. Bamideler

ln the early

years, the CBN'S
policy
was based on a
monetary
system of direct control with emphasis

on credit ceiling and allocation; and
administrative fixing of interest and
exchange rates to influence the
tempo of economic activity and
stabilize the price level (CBN, 1998).
Following the general economic

deregulation and f inancial
liberalization

of

1986, emphasis

shifted to the use of indirect or marke!

based method that favours trading in
financial instruments in influencing
the cost and availability of credit.
Under both regimes, the nominal
anchor remained monetary targeting.
It is instructive to note that regardless
of any particular regime, monetary
policy conduct requires the use of an

A. Bamidele

1.0

lntroduction

As a country's monetary authority, a
central bank is responsible for the

appropriate nominal anchor in order
to achieve and maintain the desired

monetary policy. This
onerous process begins with
developing a plan of action of

conditions.

conduct

of

employing interest rates or controlling
the money stock to influence the
economy. The focus of monetary
pollcy is to safeguard the value of the
domestic curency in terms of what it
can purchase as a basis ofproviding a

monetary and financial market

ln view of the importance of nominal
anchor in the conduct of monetary
policy, this paper seeks to examine in
details nominal anchors available to a

wider government economic

central bank in achieving its core
mandate. Ancillary to this is the
examination of the nominal anchor
employed by the Central Bank of

eionomic growth, employment, stable

the way forward as the

framework for the achievement of

oQjectives

of

non-inflationary

exchange rate, favourable balance of
payments and more generallya stable
f

inancial environment for the

economy. Policy implementation
involves a complex and time
consuming process; and the use of
some tools to influence changes in
interest rates and the amount of
money and credit in the economy. By
influencing the cost and availability of
money/credit, monetary policy actions
impact, albeit with some time lag, the
level of prices, spending, employment
and output.

Following

in the mould of

central

banking activity, the Central Bank of
Nigeria (CBN) has had to employ a
particular nominal anchor under
different regimes of monetary policy.

Nigeria in the recent past and proffer
nation's

monetary authorities prepare for
migration to inflation targeting
framework of monetary policy.
Following this introduction, section ll

presents some conceptual and
theoretical issues. Section lll
examines the choice of nominal
anchor by the Central Bank of Nigeria
in its different regimes of monetary
policy, while section lV presents some
policy recommendations in ensuring
the efficacy of any chosen nominal

in

Nigeria. The paper is
concluded in section V

anchor

2,0
2.1

ConceptualFramework

Theoreticalconcept

Theoretically, nominal anchor

mechanism

of

is

general price level in an ecrnomy. The

need for equilibrium in markets for
goods and factor services determines
the structure of relative prices, but this
could be achieved with any absolute
price level. The use of a nominal
anchor is a way of making credible the
promise of keeping some price index
stable, (Blak, 2002). As a working

defin

ition in central banking

phraseology, a nominal anchor refers
to an intermediate variable/target the
monetary authorities employ to tie
down the policy objective of price

stability or low inflation rate. This is

because, adherence to a nominal
anchor keeps the nominal variable
within a narrow range and thus
promotes price stability by directly
promoting low and stable inflation
expectations. The choice of a nominal

anchor arises from the inability of
central banks to impact directly on
ultimate goals of policy as well as the
complex nature of the transmission
mechanism of monetary policy. The
choice of intermediate target or
nominal anchor is, however, guided by

a

numUer

of factors including

measurability, control and precision of
the instrumental variable's efiect on

in order to direct
achievement of ultimate goals.
Consequently, a variable such as
money supply, exchange rate, inflation
rate or nominal gross domestic
goal variable,

monetary policy towards the

product (GDP) is usually targeted as
the intermediate variable of interest in

a bid to achieve the ultimate goal of
price stability and/or output growth.
These targets are, however, not
directly affected by policy tools,
making central banks to choose
another set of variables such as
base/reserve money, policy interest
rate, etc., which are more responsive

to policy

actions,

as

operating

variables. More fundamentally, central
banks resort to the use of nominal
anchor owing to recognition of the fact
that monetary policy impacts on the
ultimate ob.iectives with a substantial
lag.

a

determining the

Central banks or monetary authorities

'Mt A. Bafiidele is on,lssista Dircctor in the Monetary Policy Division olMonetary Policy Depanfieni Central Banl< ofNigetia, Abuja. The views exp?ssed in
paper arc those ofthe Author ond do not in any r,ay rcpresent those ofthe Canol Ba* ofNigeno
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deliberately employ nominal anchor
to stabilize the price level as well as
resolve the ever present problem of

employment of some ta rgets
(intermediate variable/nominal
anchor) that can affect the goals

makes
monetary policy conducted on a

directly. Howevel even these targets
are not directly affected by the central
bank policy tools. lt chooses another
set of variables to aim, called policy or
operating instrumenutarget such as

time inconsistency that

discretionary day-to-day basis to lead
poor long-run outcomes. The
pursuit of short{erm goals arises from
the temptation to pursue an expedient
expansionary monetary policy that is
more than firms and households
expect because such a policy would
boost economic activity in the shortrun. Whereas the best policy is not to
pursue expansionary policy because
when firms and workers see a central

to

bank pursuing an expansionary

policy, they raise their expectations

about inflation, thereby driving up
prices in the product and labour
markets. lndeed, the rise in prices and
wages leads to higher inflation without
any appreciable increase in output.
Nominal anchor is also employed to

limit political pressures for

time-

inconsistency problem arising from
temporary shocks which resides more
in the political circles. This is because,
even if a central bank recognizes that
discretionary policy would lead to a
poor outcome, it may still not be able
to pursue the better policy option of
inflation control, because of political
pressures on the central bank to try to

boost output through an overly

base money, which is more
responsive to its policy tools and
actions. The po licy/o p e ra tin g

a variable that
responds to central bank's policy
actions and indicates the stance of
monetary policy. Three conditions
must be satisfied in the choice of a
policy instrument. lt must be
observable and measurable; it must
be controllable by the central bank;
and it must have a predictable effect
on goal(s). ln view of the linkage
between the intermediate and
instrument must be

policy/operating instruments, the duo

are used to direct monetary policy
towards the achievement of ultimate
goal(s).

A number of nominal anchor exisl in

literature. These include monetary
targeting; exchange rate targeting
which could take the form of currency

boards or dollarization; inflation
targeting. Others include nominal
gross domeslic product (GDP)
targeting or implicit nominal anchor or

potential GDP and q uantitative

expansionary monetary policy. A
nominal anchor is thus like setting

easing. ln what follows in this section

behavioural rules to prevent the timeinconsistency problem in monetary

nominalanchors.

policy by providing an expected
constraint

on discretionary policy

(Mishkin,2007).

taking a medium- to long{erm view.
An important element of this approach
to monetary policy is basing decisions
on the impact financial variables have
or are expected to have in the real

world. Rather than focus on what is
moving most dramatically, monetary
policy should focus on the objective of
price stability and the achievement of
a low and stable rate of inflation,
basing decisions on an understanding

of how the real economy operales.

h.

conducted

monetary policy is
by central banks to

ultimately achieve policy goals, the
process involved known as the
transmission mechanism is complex,
time consuming and therefore difficult

to

manage. This leads

discussion

2.1.1

of each of

these

MonetaryTargeting

the most traditional of
nominal anchors, monetary targeting
Perhaps,

l\,lonetary policy is a foruuard-looking
act that focuses on the real economy

Althoug

is a

to

the

refers

to the use of

monetary

aggregates such as money supply or
any other measure of money stock as
the intermediate variable of interest
that the monetary authorities target in
order to impact on the ultimate policy
objective of price stability. The use of
monelary targeting as a framework of
monetary policy means a central bank
announces a certain target of the
annual rate of growth of the monetary

aggregate of choice, such as 10.0
percent of broad money (M2). The
central bank is therefore accountable

for achieving the target. ln practice,
the central bank tries to control the
base money (operating variable)
upon which the money stock (nominal

anchor/intermediate variable) is built
given the multiplier principle. The
4

base money is nothing other than the
liability of the central bank comprising
currency in circulation plus deposit
money banks' deposit with the central
bank. The deposit money banks'
deposit with the central bank is further
broken down into legally required

reserve and other reserves
voluntarily kept as buffer stock by the

latter with the former. Monetary
aggregate as a nominal anchor
performs well provided the
assumption of stable multiplier and
income velocity of money holds in an
economy.

The attraction of the use of monetary

in its advantages
including allowing central banks to

targeting lies

cope with domestic considerations,
and/or
output growth, in solving the
monetary policy question. Others

for example inflation rate
include its ability

to

immediately

signal monetary policy stance and
help fix inflation expectations; and
accountability of central banks. lt is
easy to implement under direct and
market-based systems of monetary
policy regimes even in underdeveloped financial markets. lts
quantitative nature makes it a ready
benchmark in many cou ntries'
monetary programme, especially
when involved in stabilization or other
programmes with the lnternational
Monetary Fund (lMF).

The greatest short-coming of
monetary targeting is that its efficacy
depends on a strong, predictable and
reliable relationship between the goal
variable (income or output) and the
targeted monetary aggregate without
which the advantages may remain
elusive. lf the relationship between
the chosen monetary aggregate and
the ultimate policy objective is weak,
as have been found in the United
States in the early 1990s, monetary

targeting would not work. For
instance, the assumed stable

relationship between money supply
and nominal GDP as measured by

income velocity, may not exist
especially in the short-run in many
jurisdictions including developed
economies. Little wonder then that in

many countries, owing to the weak

relationship between goal(s) and
monetary aggregate, the lafter has

failed to serve well as

a

communications device therefore
limlting accountability of the central
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bank. Consequently, countries such

as Canada, USA, United Kingdom,
Australia and a host of others

abandoned monetary targeting for
otherframeworks of monetary policy.

2.1.2

Exchange rate targeting otherwise
known as exchange rate peg refers to
the fixing of the value of the domestic

to a

commodity

or

handled by the erstwhile WestAfrican
Currency Board (WACB).

Oollarization
Dollaflzation takes place in a country
when a 'sound" currency such as the

Exchange Rate Targeting

currency

their monetary policy function

a

currency. lt has its origin in the preWorld War I era, when the gold
standard was practiced at which time

the currency of most countries was
convertible directly to gold at fixed
rates. ln recent times, exchange rate

targeting involves the fixing of the
value of the domestic currency to
another called the anchor currency.

United States dollar is adopted as a
country's legal tender currency as
was the case in Ecuador in 2000. This

is an indication of a

strong

commitment to fixed exchange rate
mechanism than a currency board.
Whereas, a currency board can be
abandoned, by allowing a change in
the value of the domestic currency, a
change in value is impossible under a
system of dollarization. The greatest
selling point of dollarization is its total

avoidance

of

possibility

of

a

The choice of the currency country to

speculative attack on the domestic

is

currency, which could still be possible
under a currency board arrangement.

which the domestic currency

anchored is usually informed by the
relative stability and low inflation of

that country as well as the relative
weightof the chosen country's trade in
the former's international trade.
Alternatively, a crawling target or peg
may be adopted, whereby a country is
allowed to depreciate at a steady rate
as long as the rate of inflation is higher

than in the anchor country. There are

two variants of exchange rate
targeting in literature vis: currency

board and dollarization

arran9ements.

Currency Board
Currency Board is practiced where a

country's currency is backed by a
foreign cunency 100.0 percent. This

means, the country's monetary
authority or government maintains a

fixed exchange rate to the foreign
currency and stands ready to
exchange domestic cunency for the
foreign cunency at the established
rate on request by members of the
public. Unlike the typical fixed
exchange rate that still allows some
level of discretion in the conduct of
monetary policy, a curency board
arrangement presupposes th at
monetary policy is completely taken
out ofthe hand ofa central bank orthe
government and is therefore on autopilot. Currency board had been
established in such countries as
Argentina, Hong Kong and Bulgaria to
mention a few. This was the practice in
the West African sub-region prior to
political independence when Nigeria

and three other British colonies had

Exchange rate targeting is embraced
as a framework of monetary policy in
both industrialized and emerging

market economies for a number of
reasons. These include its simplicity

and clarity that makes for

easy
understanding by stakeholders and
the general public through such

slogans as a sound currency
especially where the domestic
currency is weak. The nominal
anchor has the ability to provide an
automatic rule for the conduct of
monetary policy which mitigates the
time-inconsistency problem. This is
because exchange rate target forces
a loosening of policy when there is a
tendency for the domestic currency to
appreciate or a tightening of policy

when there

is

tendency

for

the

domestic currency to depreciate thus
disallowing discretionary monetary

policy to the barest minimum. An

exchange rate target has the capacity
to keep inflation under control by
anchoring the inflation rate of traded
goods to that in the anchor country.
This is accomplished as the prices of

tradable commodities are set by the

world market, while the domestic
prices of such goods are fixed by the
exchange rate target. Also, the central
bank no longer has the ability to print
money and thereby cause inflation,
while at the same time speculative

attack on

a

country's currency is

discouraged. This has been found
useful in emerging market countries
such as Mexico where was

it

5

employed and brought inflation down
considerably prior to devaluation. This
framework is useful where a central
bank lacks independence or political
pressures on the monetary authorities
lead to an inflation-biased monetary
policy as witnessed in ltaly and post
1992 United Kingdom and France.

Exchange rate target is usually
employed when integrating a
domestic economy with its neighbours
as happened in the currency pegs that
preceded the European Monetary
Union. Emerging markeudeveloping
countries also might flnd exchange
rate targeting useful owing to under-

developed nature of domestic
financial market or weak fiscal and
monetary institutions or where a
country experiences episodes of
hyperinflation.
Notwithstanding the positive side of an

exchange rate targeting framework, it
is bedeviled with many shortcomings.
First, it weakens the accountability of

monetary policy makers

as

it

eliminates important signals that can
assist in containing monetary policy
from becoming too expansionary. With
the capital mobility, an exchange rate

targeting country looses its

discretionary/independent monetary
policy to respond to domestic random
shocks that are not associated to
those of the anchor country On the
other hand, the shocks in the anchor
country are directly and automatically
transmitted to the targeting country, as
changes in interest rate in the anchor

country lead to corresponding
changes in interest rate In the
anchoring country.

An

important

disadvantage of exchange rate target
is exposure ofthe anchoring countryto
speculative attacks on its currency.
There is also the loss of capacity of a
central bank to perform the lender-oflast-resort function implying that other
means of copping with banking crises
must be found. ln this case, if there is a
speculative attack on a currency, the

resultant exchange

of

domestic

currency for foreign currency leads to
a contraction in the money supply with

a

damaging effect on the domestic
economy especially under a cunency
board system. Furthermore, a central

bank looses seigniorage accruable
from currency production especially
under a dollarization arrangement.
Such losses may be substantial and
compromise budgetary independence
ofa central bank (Mishkin 2007).
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lnflation targeting

Over the years, practical experiences
in both developed and developing

countries have increasingly
demonstrated that nominal anchors
such as exchange rate and monetary
aggregates have proved increasingly
u

nreliable. For instance, the

increasing variability of the velocity of
income i.e. the relationship between
monetary aggregates and ultimate
goals such as inflation and/or output
growth in many economies in recent

time has led to poor goal
achievemenls on the part of central

banks, leading to the search for a
better nominal anchor. There has also

been growing empirical evidence in
support of negative correlation
between output groMh and inflation,
contrary to the traditional view of
positive relationship implied by the

Phillips curve. The negative

relationship implies that low inflation
does not have to be achieved at the

expense

of groMh,

meaning that

adopting low inflation as the principal
objective of monetary policy may not
be a bad policy. As a means of
resolving the issue, some countries
have migrated to inflation targeting

(lT) as a framework of

monetary
policy to achieve price stability. New
Zealand was the first to blaze the trail
in 1990 followed by Canada (1991 ),
the United Kingdom (1992), and many
others including lsrael (1991), Chile
(1990) and Brazil ( 1999). There is yet
no universal definition of inflation

targeting

as the concept is

just

evolving. However, at the operational

level, some kind of generic

characterizations could be found in
literature. One of such is that inflation

targeting is an exercise of
"constrained discretion" (Bernanke
and Mishkin 1997; King 2002; Kurtner

the nominal anchor of monetary
policy. The importance of inflation

stability, etc., must be subordinated to

targeting lies in the fact that it clearly
specifies the inflation objective and a
clear commitment to achievement of

considerations such as availability of

this objective given that monetary
policy works in part by influencing
inflation expectation. lnflatio n
targeting involves several elements,

chief amongst which is the public
announcement of the medium-term
numerical inflation target ex-ante

which could be in the form of point or
band target. The measure of the

inflation target must be specified

whether consumer price index or not
and the basket of goods and services
be included. There must be
institutional commitment to price

to

as the primary goal of
monetary policy by the fiscal and
monetary a uthorities under an
environment of effective fiscal and
monetary policy co-ordination and a
commitment to achieve that target.
Others include an information
inclusive approach whereby many
financial and economic variables are
employed in making decisions on
stability

monetary policy: increasing

transparency of the monetary policy
process through communication with
the market and the public about plans
and objectives of monetary policy;
and increasing accountability of the
central bank for achieving the inflation
target.

This nominal anchor requires

a

number of pre-conditions for its
successful implementation as a
monetary policy anchor. The flrst
requirement for the adoption of lT in
any country is that the central bank
should have a considerable degree of
independence. This is instrument
and/or goal independence and must
be free from fiscal dominance in which

and Posen 2002). The constraint is
always the inflation target, while the
discretion is the inbuilt flexibility that
offers decision makers so me

constrained by fiscal considerations.

allowance to take account of short-run

should be low or non-existent, while

considerations.

As in

monetary

targeting, a central bank announces
the inflation target, say 4.0 percent, it

wishes to achieve in the medium-

term. The central bank

is

then
accountable for achieving the target
inflation rate.

lnflation targeting puts price stability
as the primary objective of monetary
policy as the inflation target becomes

monetary policy

is

dictated or

This implies that public sector
borrowing from the central bank
government should have a broad
revenue base and should not rely on
seigniorage. The domestic financial
market should have enough depth to
absorb public and private debt
placements, while the accumulation
of public debt (foreign and domestic)
should be sustainable. There must be
absence of multiple policy objectives,
meaning that other objectives, such
as high employment, exchange rate
6

the inflation objective. Equally
important are technical
a

plethora of data/information and

appropriate model(s) or methodology
for inflation forecasting that provides
the monetary authorities with the right
signals about the time-path of future
inflation in order to successfully hit the

target; and entrenched
macroeconomic stability.

Speciflcation

of the inflation target

requires making a number of choices
with respect to the price index to use
in defining the target, setting the
target in terms ofthe price level or rale
of inflation, the type of inflation (core

or

headline), giving the targel a

numerical value. the target horizon

and determining escape

clauses

under specific circumstances. The
domestic financial market must be
sufficiently deep and well developed
to enable non-monetary financing of
government borrowing,

implementation of monetary policy
with market-based instruments and
non-complication of monetary policy

by weak financial

market

infrastructure.

Three variants of lT are found in
literature, depending on the level of
development of the domestic
economy and commitment of the
central bank towards achieving its
ob.iective. The most precise is the
Full-Fledged lnflation ta rgeting
(FFIT); practiced by countries that
have medium to high level of
credibility, and are clearly committed
to inflation target. This commitment is
institutionalized legally in the form of

specification of the goal and/or
instrumenl of the central bank as

means of enhancing the

transparency of the monetary policy
framework and accountability of the
central bank. Others include Eclectic

lnflation Targeting (ElT), in which
practicing countries command

sufficient credibility that can afford
them maintain low and stable inflation

without

fu

ll

transparency and

accountability. However, in spite of a
record of low and stable inflation
coupled with high degree of financial
stability, such economies pursue
other policy objectives beside price
stability, for example, the United
States of America. lnflation Targeting
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Lite (lTL) is another variant whereby
countries announce a broad inflation
objective, but owing to low credibility
and weak financial market, monetary
authorities are not able to maintain
inflation as the sole policy objective.
Their relatively low credibility reflects

vulnerability to economic shocks,
financial instability and a weak
institutional framework. ITL can be

viewed as a transitional regime during
which the authorities implement the
structural reforms required for the
credible adoption of inflation target as
a nominal anchor in the medium- to

long{erm.
lnflation targeting has been embraced
by many central banks because of its
transparency arising from its simplicity
and clarity of target which make
market participants and the general

public to understand the thrust of
monetary policy. Consequently, it
brings down inflation expectation as
well as reduces the effect of
inflationary shocks. lt does not rely on

a

stable relationship between

monetary aggregate(s) and inflation.

Above

all, it increases the

accountability of the central bank.

lT has been criticized by a number of
economists on a number of issues

including being prone

to

delayed
signaling owing to the long lags in the
effect of monetary policy, making
inflation outcomes to be revealed only

after

a

substantial lag. Another

of an lT monetary

policy
framework is low growth in output and
employment associated with inflation
reduction at the onset of an lT
strategy. However, once low inflation
levels were achieved, output and
employment have been known to

concern

return

to

normal levels, thus

promoting real economic growth in the
long-run. lT has also been criticized
for focusing too much on inflation
which may lead to too tight a monetary
policy when inflation is above target

and thus promote larger output
fluctuations, For this reason, all
inflation targeters set their inflation
target above zero reflecting the
concern of monetary policymakers
that too low inflation or deflation can
have negative effects on real
economic activity such as flnancial
instability and precipitation of severe
economic contraction.

2.1.4 Nominal

GDP Targeting
(l m p
Nominal Anchor)
Potential GDP

licit

The presence of long lags between
monetary policy actions and their
effects means that monetary policy
cannot wait lo respond until inflation
has begun in order to avoid severe
policy tightening which might even be
too late to maintain price stability. To
prevent inflation from getting started
or gathering momentum, monetary
policy must be forward-looking and in

some cases pre-emptive. ln view of
the crucial nature of price stability to
the health of the economy in the longrun, many countries have accorded
price stability the primary long-run
goal of monetary authorities. Thus,
the overriding concem of a central
bank becomes the control of inflation
in the long-run, while consideration is
given to output and/or employment in
the short-run using an implicit rather
than an explicit nominal anchor.

The implicit nominal anchor strategy

does not rely on money-inflation
relationsh ip. Rather it involves
forward-looking actions whereby
careful monitoring for signs of future

inflation using a wide range of
information coupled with "periodic
pre-emptive strikes" by monetary
policy against the threat of inflation.

This is often the case where a central
bank is saddled with dual mandates
as is the case with the United States of
America's Federal Reserve System.
For instance, the Federal Reserve
was given a dual mandate according
to its statute which states that, "the
Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System and the Federal

Open Market Committee shall
maintain long-run growth of the
economy and credit aggregates
commensurate with the economy's
long-run potential to increase
production, so as to promote
effectively the goals of maximum
employment, stable prices and
moderate long-run interest rates",
(Mishkin,2007).

The greatest drawback of implicit
nominal anchor strategy as a
framework of monetary policy is its
lack oftransparency which more often

than not keeps the market guessing
on the lhrust of monetary policy.
Secondly, the success of this strategy
depends very much on individuals in

1

charge. Although, the framework
worked well underAlan Greenspan as

the immediate past Chairman of the
Federal Reserve System, it is not clear

whether the same would be achieved
under somebody else or elsewhere.

Given these shortcomings, implicit
nominal anchor breeds low
accountability and transparency.

2,1.5

QuantitativeEasing

Quantitative easing is another nominal
anchor usually employed in periods of

large scale deflation to put money in

the economy through the deposit
money banks. The purpose is to

encourage investment when

traditional operating instrument such
as interest rate has failed. lt is aimed at

easing liquidity crunch in a manner
that reduces pressure from banks.
Underthis framework, a central bank's

principal operating instru ment
becomes the level of current account
balances held by financial institutions
at the central bank. ln practice, the
central bank provides ample liquidity
and the policy/call rate is determined
in the market. is therefore the
creation of new money by a central
bank and its injection to the banking
system, i.e. the deliberate expansion

lt

of money supply in an economy. A
central bank does this by using new
money to purchase treasury securities

(bonds, treasury bills and certificates,
etc) in the open market, or by buying

private sector assets from banks in

or by lending
new money to DMBs or a combination
of these actions. The new money thus
created is deposited in the accounts of
the DMBs which in turn create new
money through the fractional reserve
banking system in a process known as
exchange for money,

deposit multiplication. This policy
action results in reducing interest
yields on gilt-edge instruments and
reducing inter-bank interest rate and
thus encourages banks to grant credit
tothe realeconomy.

On a technical note,

quantitative
easing refers to an increase in the size
of the balance sheet of the central
bank through an increase in its

monetary liability (base money),

holding constant its asset
lt is also a shift in the
composition of the assets of the
central bank towards less liquid and
riskier assets, holding constant the
size of the balance sheet. The less
composition.
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liquid and more risky assets can be
private securities which may be toxic
as well as sovereign or sovereignguaranteed instruments that include
all forms of risks such as liquidity and

credit risks, (htto://en.wikipedia.

org/wiki). The Bank of Japan (BOJ)
employed quantitative easing to fight
domestic deflation in the early 2000s.

During the global flnancial crisis of
200712008, policies announced by

inflation outcomes remain consistent
with the medium{erm target range.
Furthermore, under the 1989 Act, the
government reserves the power to
override the PTA for a 12-month
period, which must be done publicly

and transparently. Since

1990,
several PTAs have been signed,
however, a new one must be signed
each time a Governor is appointed,
htto ://www. rbnz. oovt. nz.

the Federal Reserve System, the
ECB and Bank of England to counter
the effects of the crisrs were akin to
quantitative easing in addition to the
issuance of new debt instruments.

2.2

Country/Jurisdictional
Practice

Reserve Bank of NewZealand

The Reserve Bank of New Zealand
(the Reserve Bank) pioneered, in

'1989/90, the use of inflation targeting
as a framework of monetary policy as

a response to the experiences of the
1960s and 1970s, when New Zealand

like many other industrialized

economies, experienced high
inflation. ln 1989, the Reserve Bank
was statutorily authorized to control
inflation as provided in sectron 8 ofthe
Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act
1989. The details of the provisions of
the Act were contained in a contract
between the Governor of the Reserve
Bankand the Finance Minister, known

as the policy targets

agreement
lnitially, the
PTA called for a reduction of inflation

(PTA), signed

in 1990.

to a 0-2 percent increase in the CPI by
1992, which the bank achieved ahead

of schedule. The initial target range
has since been reviewed to a range of

1-3 percent per annum since 2002
PTA. This means that inflation can
move outside the band in the shortterm, but on the average should be

within the band in the medium- to
long{erm. The contract also requires
the Reserve Bank to accomplish the
target without unnecessary instability
in output, interest rates and the
exchange rale and shall be
accountable for its judgements and
actions in implementing monetary
policy. ln cases when the annual rate
of inflation falls outside the mediumterm target or when such cases are
imminent, the Reserve Bank shall
explain in policy statements why such
outcomes have happened or about to
occur, what measures it has taken or

contemplates to take, to ensure that

principal policy lever. The latest PTA

was signed in May 2007 for an
inflation target range of 1.0-3.0
percent for the medium-term. With
the year-on-year rate of inflation

reaching 5.1 percent as at September
2008 from 1.8 percent a year earlier,
the Reserve Bank has adjusted OCR

as contained in its
Monetary Policy Statement to
achieve this target range in the
medium{erm in spite of the global
accordingly

The Reserve Bank has since March
1999 employed the official cash rate
(OCR), i.e. its policy rate, as the
operating inslrument given the
influence that this has on the banking

financial turmoil.

system, financial markets and a whole
range of factors that help keep
inflation in control. This is because

the other is confidence in

most registered banks hold

Bank ot England
One ofthe Bank of England's two core

objectives is monetary stability while
the
currency. To achieve this objective,
the Bank of England (BoE) adopted

settlement accounts with the ReseNe

different monetary anchors at

obligations among themselves at the

the financial and

Bank with which they settle

end of each business day. The
Reserve Bank pays interest on
settlement account balances and

charges interesl on

overn ig ht

borrowing at rates related to the OCR.
It is importantto note that the Reserve

Bank sets no limit on the amount of
cash it will borrow or lend at rates

related to the OCR. Consequently,
market interest rates are generally
held around the OCR although these
rates, particularly longer-term ones
are also influenced by offshore
interest rates as New Zealand
financial institutions are net borrowers

in overseas financial markets. The
OCR is an interest rate set by the
Reserve Bank to meet the inflation
specified in the PTA, and is reviewed
eight times a year. Unscheduled
review of the OCR could also take
place in response to unexpected
developments, such as the 9/11

tenorist attacks on the World Trade
Centre in New York in 2001 or the
g loba I financial meltdown of
2007/2008 which also originated from
the US. Prior to 1999, the Reserve
Bank employed a variety of indirect

and complex instruments
influencing

the money stock

in

and

signaling desired monetary
conditions to the financial market
through a monetary condition index.

lnflation targeting anchor

as

employed by the Reserve Bank has
no doubt performed well in achieving

its principal mandate of

controlling

lation, especially with the
introduction of the OCR as the
inf

8

different times given the dynamism of

economic

landscape. For instance, it adopted
inflation targeting as a framework of

monetary policy

when

it

in

October, 1992
its erstwhile

jettisoned

nominal anchor of monetary targeting
practiced since the 1970s. During the

era of monetary targeting, the BoE,
like other central banks that practiced
this framework, never adhered strictly

to the ironclad rules of growing the
chosen monetary aggregate at a
constanl rate as postulated by Milton
Friedman (1968). At the inception of
lT as a nominal anchor, an inflation

target range of about 3.0 percent
band-with ftom 14 percent was
applied before setting the target at 2.5
percent in'1997. Under this approach,
monetary policy operates in the UK
mainly through influencing the price
of money i.e. the interest rate. By May
1997, the BoE was granted a more
independent role in monetary policy
by granting it the power to set interest

rales

to

meet the government's

inflation target (currently 2.0 percent)
which is usually announced each

year by the Chancellor of the
Exchequer in the annual budget
statement. lndeed, the 1998 Bank of

England Act made the Bank
independent to sel inlerest rates,
while the Bank is accountable to
parliament and the general public.
The legislation, however, provides
that where the national interesl
demands, the government has the
power to give instructions to the BoE
on interest rates for a limited period
(http://www.bankofengland.co.uk)
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The inflation target is expressed in
terms of an annual rate of inflation
based on the consumer price index
(CPl) which should not be missed by
more than +/- 1.0 percentage point. ln
the eventofthe target being missed by

not more than +l 1.0 percentage
point, the Governor must write an

open Ietter

to the

Chancellor

explaining the reasons for the inflation
oulcome and what the Bank proposes

to do to ensure that the target is
achieved. Besides, the BoE publishes
the minutes of its monetary policy

committee meetings and the
decisions at such meetings in the form

lnflation Report. Prior to the
adoption of inflation target as a
framework of monetary policy,

of

inflation peaked at 9.0 percent in 1991
and a rate of 4.0 percent in 1992 at the
commencement of the inflation target
as a nominal anchor. The exercise
paid-off within a short time as inflation
was subdued to 2.2 percent, around
the target range, in the third quarter of
1994. lnflation has remained low in the
United Kingdom since the adoption of

inflation target as

a nominal anchor

Under Alan Greenspan, the Federal
Reserve System employed an implicit
nominal anchor in the form of an
oveniding concern to control inflation
in the long run. The federal funds rale
continued to be targeted coupled with

preemptive strike to head off any
future inflationary pressures or

negative shocks to demand by
adjusting the federalfunds rate as the
need arose. The federal funds rate is
usually announced at the end of each
of the eight Federal Open Market

Committee (FOMC) meetin gs
annually at which decisions are made
regarding the conduct of open market
operalions that influence the money

supply and interest rates. The
approach was forward-looking as

there was careful monitoring for signs
of future price fluctuations through an

all

information inclusive strategy
coupled with preemptive monetary
policy to ward off the threat of
inflation, thus helping to prolong
business cycle expansion in the US.
This fonarard-looking and preemptive
monetary policy approach is akin to
inflation targeting as monetary policy

coupled with a strong growth with the

instruments are adjusted to take care

attendant reduction

of lags in their effects to hit future
inflation targets. Like inflation

in the rate of

unemployment.

targeting, the approach does not rely

The Federal Reserve System i.e. the

United States of America's central
bank is best known for carrying out
monetary policy for infl uencing money
and credit conditions to promote goals

of high employment, sustainable

economic growth and stable prices as
stipulated in its Act. The Bank has
employed different nominal anchors
at one time or the other to achieve
these mandates. For instance, in the
1950s and 1960s, the Bank targeted

money market

cond

itions

sta b le money-inflation
relationship bul stresses on price
stability to discourage overly

on a

Th6 Federal Reserve System

and

particularly interest rates. This was a
procyclical monetary policy which led
to serious criticisms that made the
Bank to change gear. The Federal
Reserve System practiced monetary
targeting in the 1970s when it publicly
announced its money supply targets.

By 1979, the Bank migrated to an
operating procedure that focused on
non-borrowed reserues and control of
the monetary aggregates and less on

the federal funds rate. ln July 1993,
the Federal Reserves System
abandoned the use of monetary
aggregates as a guide for monetary
policy and returned to using a federal

expansionary monetary policy, and so

ameliorated the time-inconsistency
problem. However, apart from being
less transparent, the approach is
different from inflation targeting as it
does not officially have a nomlnal
anchor.

The implicit nominal anchor
continued after Alan Greenspan but
received a jolt since the global
financial and economic meltdown

stated in mid-2007 caused by the US
sub-prime mortgage crisis.As in other
countries, the focus of monetary
policy has been making financial
markets function. Thus, policy rate
had been lowered even close to zero
in addition to other monetary and
fiscalstimuli such as injection offunds

to financial and

monetary policy is to maintain price
stability through a single monetary
policy forthe Eurosystem as laid down
in the Treaty establishing the
European Community. The Treaty
provisions, however, imply that in
doing this the Eurosystem should also
take into account the broader
economic goals of the Community
including avoidance of excessive

fluctuations in output and
employment. To achieve this
mandate, the European Central
Bank's (ECB) practices a hybrid
monetary policy framework that
combines elements of monetary

targeting framework as employed by
Germany's Bundesbank and those of
inflation targeting
://www.ecb.int
Up to 2003, the ECB's monetary policy
framework was close to monetary
targeting as it sets a reference value
for the growth of the chosen monetary
aggregate. Like inflation targeting
central banks, the ECB has an

announced inflation target goal over

the medium{erm which it sets at
below, but close to 2.0 percent.
lnflation is measured by an index

which has been harmonised across all
EU Member States: the Harmonised
lndex of Consumer Prices (HICP) to
define and assess price stability in the
euro area as a whole in quantitative
terms.

The Eurosystem is the sole issuer of
banknotes and bank reserves which
are liabilities of in the Eurosystem's
balance sheet. By virtue of being the
sole supplier of bank notes the ECB
can set the conditions at which banks

borrow from the central bank.
Therefore it can also influence the
conditions at which banks trade with

each other in the money market. ln its
operations. the central bank also aims
to ensure a proper functioning of the

money market and

to help credit

institutions meet their liquidity needs in
a smooth manner. This is achieved by
providing facilities for credit intitutions
to square up their positions at the end

of

business daily and regular

refinancing that allow them to cushion
transitory liquidity fl uctuations.

non-financial
institutions, recapitalization among

ln

others.

objective, the Eurosystem uses a set

the

European Central Bank's (ECB'S)

funds rate target in the early 1990s.
9

to

achieve

its

primary

of monetary policy instruments and
procedures. These include open

European Central Bank

The primary objective of

order

market operations, standing facility
and minimum reserves on accounts
with the Eurosystem. This set forms
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the operational f ramework

to

implement the single monetary policy.

Two pillars are central to the ECB'S
monetary policy strategy, namely, an
assessment of monetary and credit
aggregates for their implications for
future inflation and economic groMh

as well as evaluation of

other

economic variables to predict future
economic outlook. Although, the ECB

insists that

it

does not have

an

inflation target, many critics have not
failed to criticize
of ambiguity,
especially against the backdrop of a
"below but close to 2.0 percent
inflation goal. Because, the ECB's
monetary policy framework could not
be pinned down to either monetary or

it

inflation targeting, accountability of

the bank has been found to

be

minimal.
Bank ofCanada

ln furtherance of its commitment to
contributing to the well-being of the
country by keeping inflation low,
stable and predictable, the Bank of
Canada (BOC) formally committed
itself to inflation targeting as a
framework of monetary policy on
February 26, 1991 with a joint
announcement by the govemor of the

bank and the country's

finance

minister. The comerstone of the Bank

of

Canada's moneta

ry

policy

framework is a target of inflation, as

measured by a. variant of the
mnsumer price index (CPl) that
excludes sorhe components that are

policy opaque. Thus, apart from
satisling the pre-requisite of public
announcement, the decision to
migrate to and implementation of
Inflation targeting enjoys the
commitment of both fiscal and
mQnetary authorities right from
inception. The inflation target works
hand in hand with a policy of flexible
exchange rate regime that is
influenced by domestic and foreign

economic conditions, world

commodity prices and international
financial market conditions. ln
carrying out its monetary policy
function, the BOC tries to influence
short-term interest rates, by changing

the target inter-bank

overnight
interest rate. A change in this target
rate leads to changes in other interest

rates and consequently affects
economic units' spending and
borrowing decisions. The BOC's
Governing Council (comprising the

Governor, the

ior

Governor and four Deputy

Deputy

(CPIX) as its nominal anchor. This
decision was based on the fact that

responsible for

this variant of the consumer price

monetary policy decisions and setting
the target rates eight times a yearon a

index (CPl) is directly influenced by
changes in the RBSA'S repo rate

pre-announced time-table. The
strategies, policies and economic
analysis behind the decisions are
explained four times a year in the
BOC'S Monetary Policy document
and Updates as well as in regular

through its effect on interest rates,
though with some lag. From
inception, a medium{erm inflation

speeches by members ofthe Council.

average, take from 18 to 24 months to

Governors)

is

Sen

The BOC also explains the factors
influencing its interest rate decisions
in a press release whenever the
overnight rate target is announced.
The combination of the inflation
targeting monetary policy framework

target of two years was adopted given

that changes in interest rates in the
South African economy, on the

have material impact
on the
-inflation.
The
underlying rate of
inflation target is speci{ied as a band

to give allowance some discretion as

well as allow for some degree of
uncertainty ahd statistical variability

and a flexible exchange rale has
paved the way for a stable and

inherent in all economic process.
Operationally, the RBSA aims at
influencing the overall lending
policies of deposit money banks and
the demand for money and credit in

been without some costs. One of such
was the high rate of unemployment of
above 10.0 percent that ensued

the economy albeit indirectly through
changes in banking system liquidity
and interest rates in the money
market. Open market operations;

sustained economic growth. Critics
have, however, pointed out that
inflation target in Canada has not

between 1991 and 1994 before

declining to a more tolerable level.

transfer of government funds

Reserve Bank of SouthAfrica

system; foreign currency swaps;
outright sales or repurchase of
domestic secudties; and variable
cash reserve - requirements remain

between the RBSA and the banking

lnflation targeting as the nominal
anchor of the Reserve Bank of Africa
(RBSA) began in October 2000, with
the government decision to set an
inflation target as part of
new
approach to monetary policy and
price stabilization. This explicit anchor

a

differs from the erstwhile eclectic
monetary policy approach whereby
intermediate obiectives played a

prominent role. Mindful ofthe fact that
exclusive emphasis on inflation goals
without careful analysis of economic

conditions can lead to serious
economic distortions and higher
inflation, RBSA's application of
inflation targeting gives allowance for

supply shock; money supply and
credit extension monitoring; and
discretion. The numerical inflation
target and the monetary policy stance
are to be announced explicitly, while

the RBSA would publish twice
annually monetary policy review as a
means of increasing transparency of
the monetary policy.

The RBSA in carrying out its function
specifies inflation targeting as
achieving an average rate of increase
in the over-all consumer price index

excluding mortgage interest cost for
metropolitan and other urban areas

l0

the tools of regulating and fine-tuning

liquidity position

in the

market,

(http://www. reservebank.co.za).

The inflation objective of the RBSA
has been largely achieved as the
bank's target measure of inflation [the

year-on-year increase in the
consumer price index excluding
mortgage interest cost for
metropolitan and other urban areas
(CPIX)I remained largely within the
inflation taruet range of 3.0 6.0
percent between September 2003
and March 2007. This was in contrast

to a range of between 6.0 and 11.5
percent in the 2001-2002 period. The

of short-term moneymarket interest rates was influenced
largely by the Monetary Policy
Committee's review of the rate on
behaviour

repu rchase transactions as
appropriate. Other money-market
interest rates generally followed the
lead taken by the Reserve Bank. The

picture, however, changed as the

CPIX maintained an upward bias
from April 2007 rising to 13.6 percent

in

September, 2008. The recent

inflation spiral iryas not unconnected
with the continuing pass{hrough
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effects of inflation pressures arising
from a combination ofglobalfood and
energy price shocks; and international
financial meltdown leading to the twin
problems of slowing of economic
growth and rising headline inflation.
The RBSA continued to maintain a
cautious approach to global economic
and financial developments in line
with the general philosophy of a

flexible-inflation targeting regime
allowing for a deviation from the target
in the event of exogenous shocks that

are beyond the control of

monetary policy to prevent extreme

Bank ofJapan

misalignment in the foreign exchange

Faced by a prolonged domestic
deflation, the Bank of Japan (BOJ)
migrated to quantitative easing as a

rate and speculative attacks on the
currency. Under its floating exchange

rate regime, the bank reserves the
right to intervene in the maket where
exceptional conditions are perceived
to be injurious tothe economy.

The Central Bank's board meets
monthly to make decision on
monetary policy, based on a
comprehensive review of domestic

the
monetary authorities. Thus, RBSA
has focused mainly on a reasonable

and global economic and financial
developments. The monthly meeting

time horizon for bringing inflation back
to within the target range and avoid

countries in recent time. However, the
continued stability of the domestic

while special sessions can also be
called. Given the lags in inflation
pressures and monetary policy
effects, decisions on the Monetary
Policy Rate (MPR) are based on
projections of the most likely future
inflation path, complemented with
judgement. The BanKs board decides
the course of monetary policy action
via a vote and a summary of decisions
is communicated to the market and

RBSAto focus on the achievement of
its oore mandate of price stability as
the balance of risks curently was that

the public through official board press
release in conformity with the bank's
ConstitutionalAct requiring it to report
regularlyto the national Senate.

an unchanged monetary policy stance
was appropriate.

The Central Bank implements

second-round effects to ensure that
expectations remain p rope rly

anchored and subdue a further
acceleration of inflation. Monetary
policy decisions have been dominated

by financial market stability
in a number of

considerations

financial market has enabled the

is announced six months in advance,

monetary policy by influencing the
daily inter-bank money market

Central Bank of Chile
The Central Bank of Chile migrated to
a full-fledged inflation targeting as its

of monetary policy,
rate regime in September 1999,

framework

complemented by a floating exchange

interest rate through the control of the

supply of liquidity or monetary base,
so that the resulting interest rate is
close to the MPR. Thus, the MPR

reflects the target inter-bank rate

having experimented with a partial
inflation targeting that spanned the
preceding ten years. Both the

sought by the Central Bank. This is

framework and its complement as well
as necessary instrumenls are used to
keep annual CPI inflation around 3.0

as its other debt issues. The demand

percent with a tolerable range of +l
'1.0 percentage point. The idea is to

make the midpoint of the target range
the economy's nominal anchor over a
horizon of about two years given the
average lag between changes in the
policy instruments and their impact on
output and prices. This means that
monetary policy focuses on keeping
the average and expected CPI

at

around 3.0 percent
an nually indicating tolerance to
temporary deviations around the
target and normal variability of
variation

inflation along the business cycle. The
use of floating exchange rate enables

the conduct of an

independent

because the supply

of liquidity is

affected by maturing Central Bank's
bonds and promissory notes; as well

for liquidity, on the other hand,

is

affected by commercial banks' need
to meet legal reserve requirement and

settlement obligations in the interbank market. Daily banking system
liquidity is regulated through two main

mechanisms. These are

collateralized liquidity credit line
granted commercial banks at the
MPR plus 25 basis points and
overnight deposits with the Central

Bank at the MPR less 25 basis points.
The two rates establish a symmetrical
automatic stabilization band of 25
basis points on either side of the MPR,
within which the inter-bank lending
rate operates (Banco Central du Chile
htto://www. bcentral.cl/eng ).
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framework of monetary policy in 20O1-

2002 afler short-term interest rates
had been maintained at close to their
minimum attainable zero values to no

effect. The BOJ bought more

government bonds than would have
been required to set the interest rate at

zero. lt also bought asset-backed
securities, equities and extended
terms of commercial paper purchasing

operations. With these actions the
BOJ flooded commercial banks with
excess liquidity through excess
reserves to promote private lending
with little risk of liquidity shortage.
Under the quantitative easing policy,
emphasis was to keep pumping huge
amounts of money into the banking
system until the core consumer price
index (CPl) rose above yeaHrn-year
levels on a sustainable basis. The
quantitative easing policy was
terminated in March 2006 to give way
for the new framework of monetary
policy of conducting monetary policy in

a

forward-looking manner. The key
ideas behind the BOJ'S ftamework of
monetary policy are economic activity

and prices; price stebility;

and
normalising rates with a view to
realizing the mandate of monetary
policy as stipulated in Article 2 of the
BOJ law: to contribute "to the sound
development of the national economy'
"through the pursuit of price stability."
(htto ://www boi.or. o/en/type/press)Economic activity and prices were to
be examined one to two years ahead
and see whether the most likely
i

outlook followed a path of sustainable
groMh under price stability. Price

stability was seen as a state where
economic agents may make decisions

of

investment and consumption
without being concerned about
fluctuations in the general price level.
The idea behind normalizing rates was
to move away from the low interest
rates structure that obtained during
the deflationary period to gradually
raise interest to a level that better
reflects an improving economy.

3.0

Monetary Policy Gonduct in

Nigeria

3.1

Conduct ofMonetary Policy

and Choice of NominalAnchol

The primary mandate of the Central
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Bank of Nigeria (CBN) remained
monetary and price stability as
succinctly stated in the Central Bank
of Nigeria Act 2007. To achieve this,
the Bank's conductof monetary policy
has oscillated between two distinct
phases since 1959 to date. These are

the era of direct monetary'control
when exchange rate and monetary
targeting were practiced

(1

959-1 986),

and that of the current regime i. e.
indirect monetary control or marketbased system. ln both periods, the
policy focus has generally remained
that of ensuring monetary and price
stability; and promoting a sound
financial system (CBN Act 2007). At
inception, the CBN practiced the
exchange rate targeting framework
such that the domestic currency was
fixed at parwith the British pound and
later with a basket of 12 currencies.
This framework continued in spite of
the overvaluation of the domestic
cunency against the U.S dollar till the
early 1970s, when the Bretton Woods
system of the fixed exchange rate
regime mllapsed. The direct control
continued with monetary targeting
succeeding exchange rate targeting
in 1973. Monetary targeting at that
time was characterized by placing
resbictions on deposit money banks'

freedom

to

acquire assets

and
liabilities by imposition of ceiling on

credit creation due to the
underdeveloped nature of the
financial system.

Monetary policy is formulated using

the four-sector

economy-wide
financial programming method to
determine the optimum stock of
money required for economic
ann ually based on
conditions of stable money multiplier
and income velocity of money under

activities

the quantity theory of money. With the

monetary aggregate (broad measure
of money) determined as the quantity
to target as the nominal anchor, the
operating variable (reserve money or
base money) is derived. Monetary
Policy implementation then relied on a
multiplicity of tools including credit
ceiling on sectoral and aggregate

basis in combination

wit

h

administratively determined interest
rates; fixed exchange rate; and trade

the appropriate money slock and the
reserve money level for a given year

financial agents to accept deposits
and lend them to users. The main

mechanically determined and

the market-based regime are open
market operations (OMO), cash

are known, both aggregate and
sectoral credit ceilings are
monitored during each calendar year
to ensure that the Bank achieves the
desired monetary aggregate capable

of

making

it

realize the ultimate

objective of price stability.

instruments of monetary policy during

reserve requirement (CRR), liquidity

ratio (LR), discount window
operations and foreign exchange
swaps in recenl time, especially

(SAP) in 1986, the indirect or market-

during the Policy Support lnstrument
(PSl) programme (July 2005 June
2007\. ln recognition of the fact that
monetary policy impacts on the
ultimate objectives with a substantial
lag, the CBN continued to focus on

management was introduced with
monetary targeting remaining as the

the medium{erm in its conduct of
monetary policy, while preemptive
actions are undertaken to head off

nominal anchor. As part of the reform,
the floating exchange rate ofthe naira

any imminent infl ationary pressures.
The policy initiative was designed to

With the general economic and
financial market deregulation of
structural adjustment programme

based system of monetary

was adopted, while interest rate was
market driven. Consequently, the
primary tool of monetary policy

implementation focused on

transactions in treasury instruments
in affecting the stock of money supply

in the system by impacting on the

free monetary policy from

the

problems of time inconsistency and
over-reaction arising from temporary
shocks.

Beginning from 2004, monetary
policy became more aggressive, as

balance sheet of the deposit money
banks (DMBs). ln this regard, the
main instrument of monetary policy

the institutional framework for

was Open Market Operations (OMO),
complemented with cash reserve

Policy Committee (MPC) responsible
for policy decisions, meeting more
regulady. With efiect from 2006, the

requirement and liquidity ratio. The
paradigm shifts from control to
market-based system was made
possible due in part to the fairly

developed nature of the domestic
money market in the late 1980s and
early 1990s and also as a result ofthe
monetary authorities' deliberate
policy of developing the market
further. Throughout the two periods,
the monetary policy nominal anchor
remained that of monetary targeting,
that is, maintenance of the desired
level of the chosen monetary
aggregate (a money stock target) that
is compatible with the absorptive
capacity of the economy as well as
facilitate the achievement of low
inflation. The operating instrument
especially during the indirect system
of monetary policy remained the
reserve or base money.

Under the indirect or market-based
system of monelary policy, the
emphasis is on the power of the

monetary policy implementation was

strengthened with

the

Monetary

MPC meeting is structured into a
calendar of six times annually. At each
meeting, the MPC reviews domestic

and international financial and
economic developments through
briefs from policy and operations
departments to enable it arrive at
decisions on the Monetary Policy
Rate (MPR), among others. The MPR

serves as both the repurchase rate
and the rate atwhich the CBN lends to
DMBS; and thus form the basis upon

which overnight inter-bank money
market and other interest rates are
built. The implementation of policy
decisions is monitored weekly by the

Monetary Policy lmplementation
Committee (MPIC). The N4PIC
monitors the reserve money level,
assesses the level of compliance with

the MPC decisions and maps oul
necessary market operations to
maintain optimum system liquidity
and inter-bank interest rate around
the MPR. Monetary policy conduct

monetary authority as a dealer in the

has become much more transparent

and exchange controls to achieve the
intermediate and ultimate targets.
The framework relied heavily on the

financial market

w

assumption of fixed multiplier and

the desire of the public to hold money

income velocity of money. Thus, once

to

influence the

availability and the rate of returns on
flnancial assets, thus affecting both

balances and the willingness of

l2

ith the presentation of

a

communiqu6 by the Central Bank
Governor at a press conference
immediately after each MPC meeting.
As a means of revamping the conduct
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of

monetary policy, the erstwhile
Minimum Rediscount Rate (MRR)

was replaced by the MPR in
December 2006 initially with a

liquidity ratio were reduced to put
more funds in the hands of deposit
money banks to enable them lend to
the real economy.

corridor. The rate is made effective

using such tools as the OMO and
standing facility lending window.

Complementary to the achievement
of the goals of monetary policy is the

existence

The OMO is the primary means of
effecting changes in the level of
banking system reserves and the
interest rates at the inter-bank market.

The standing facility lending window,

on the other hand serves as a
supplementary adjustment
mechanism especially for inter-bank
member institution(s) facing liquidity
imbalance to square up their position

of a sound and

stable
linancial environment. ln a developing

economy

like Nigeria,

the

development of the financial sector is
critical given its rudimentary nature. ln
this regard, the monetary authorities'
avowed ob.iective is to ensure banking

soundness and financial sector
stability with a view lo improving the
efficiency ofthe payments system and
ensuring the effective transmission of

365 days to enhance banking system

liquidity. ln addition, both CRR and

(CBN, 2004). Other objectives include

vital prerequisites for economic
investment and growth are built. ln
Nigeria, the sectods stability is being
addressed through the adoption of
reform prog rammes, in clud in g
deregulation of the financial system

consolidation of the banking industry
(July 2004 December 2005); and

further deregulation of the foreign
exchange market (2006), among
others. At the end of the banking
industry consolidation exercise in

The outcome of monetary policy in
Nigeria using monetary targeting as
the nominal anchor has been mixed
during both periods of direct control

high price fluctuations as the rate of

a double digit
phenomenon. The inflation rate
ranged from 3.2 percent in 1972 to
57.2 percent

in 1993 with an annual average rate of
'19.8 percent between 1970 and 1993

market was under-developed, while
the banking culture was low making it
difficult for monetary policy stance to

be timely transmitted to the

real

economy. For instance, the share of

cash outside banks in currency

in

circulation was disproportionately high
grossing close to about 80.0 percent,

while the CBN was underwriting

between 75.0 and 90.0 percent of the
Nigerian Treasury Bills (NTBs) issued
during the period. Secondly, the
money multiplier was variable as
opposed to the assumption of being
fixed in nature. Thirdly, data currency

60.0
50.0
40.0

was absent as the monetary

30.0

authorities depended on end-period

20.0
10.0

0.0
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(1986); movement from direct control
1). Many factors were
to market-based technique of (Chart
responsible
for poor performance of
policy
(1993); universal
monetary
policy
monetary
the economy
banking scheme (2001); during this period.and
First, the financial

chart 1: lnflation Rate (1970 -'1993)

ot
to

t,2

inflation became

ensuring effective enforcement of
market rules to enthrone the right
market expectation. This is in
recognition of the fact that the
maintenance of financial sector
stability and rational expectation are
complementary to the achievement of

elongation of borrowing by money
market operalors from over-night to

combination as two banks merged into
one in September 2007, thus bringing
the number of deposit money banks
(DMBs) in Nigeria to twenty-four.

agents' confidence upon which

bank money market is operated on a
two-way quote system with intra-day
facility in place to ensure a seamless
operation of the market and that
interest rate hovers around the MPR.

included the admission of subnalional government bonds and
private sector securities into the
discount window operations and

consolidation programme was
welcomed by the market and was
followed by market-induced business

monetary and price stability, which are

monetary policy to the real sector

established in October, 2008 as part of
measures to make the money market
function. The key features of the EDW

eighty-nine banks. The policy-induced

and market-based system. During the
era of control, the chosen monetary
aggregate [narrow money (M1) and
later broad money (M2)l was missed
with wide margins for a greater part of
the period. Likewise, the ultimate
target of price stability was missed,
while economic activity was sluggish
leading to low groMh rate of output.
The period was characterized with

at the end of each day's business. As
part of market development, the inter-

The new interest rate policy of the
Bank has, no doubt, reduced the
volatility in the inter-bank money
market rates to the barest minimum.
With the imminence of credit crunch
arising from the global financial and
economic crisis on the domestic
money market, the expanded
discount window (EDW) was

December 2005, twenty-five strong
banks emerged from the erstwhile

\-/

I

i;ti;t;Ii;

\-./

F.l

l.rluf'n

Period
13

(month, quarter and year) statistics
usually rendered by DMBs with long

I
(

lags and with little or no access to data

Et*l

during the intervening period. This
situation continued as banking and
inter-bank operations were manually
done in the absence of, or the
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rudimentary nature of information and

with a corridor made the policy rate
more relevant as the inter-bank

communications technology (lCT) in
the economy. Also, the credibility of
banking system statistics could not be

available both in theory and in
practice as mentioned earlier.

money market rate moved around the

Exchange rate targeting may not be

MPR. Although the nominal anchor

optimum for Nigeria as this would not

vouched for as these could not be
independently verified. ln addition,
there was fiscal dominance as the

target was missed in some years, the
margin of error was slim when

allow the monetary authorities to
tackle domestic financial and

central govemment annual budget
was usually in deficit and financed

control. This might not

implicit nominal anchor

compared with the period of direct

be

unconnected with the variability of the
money multiplier which continued
especially as a result of financial
innovations. The economy performed
better as inflation was down to low
levels averaging 11.4 percent per
annum between 1999 and 2007
compared with an annual average
rcte ol 24.7 percent between 1985

largely through the banking system.

The period of marketbased or
indirect system of monetary policy at
which the quantity ofthe money stock
to be targeted moved from M1 to M2

was made possible for a number of
reasons. The inter-bank money
market became more active with the
establishment of discount houses to
perform the role of market makers as
well as relief the CBN of the role of
warehousing unsubscribed NTBs.

and 1993. Aggregate output also
performed better especially from
2003 as the annual average groMh
rate of the gross domestic product
(GDP) in real terms rose from 3.7
percent for 1999-2002 period to 7.4
percent for 2003-2007 period

Similarly, OMO and discount
operations were strengthened in
addition to availability of standing
facility window initially for deposits

(Tablel

and lending but later for lending only.

domestic inter-bank money market
also benefited from the advantages of
ICT especially in the consummation of
market operations and data rendition

to

understand the

this, the call for a more transparent
and easy to understand nominal
anchor might not be out of place. A

minimum rediscount rate (MRR) to
monetary policy rate (MPR) initially

to

inflation targeting.

However, before migrating to inflation
targeting, care must be taken to fulfill
most if not all the preconditions. Most
importantly, the buy-in of the fiscal
authorities is crucial for a successful
employment of inflation targeting as
nominal anchor, especially in the area

of

non-accommodating monetary

policy stance. lt is equally necessary

to employ inflation targeting as a
nominal anchor in Nigeria during

erivironment is less turbulent.

CBN's signal as the nominal anchor is
adjusted from time to time. ln view of

hours. The change in policy rate from

anchor

have not been metfor a greater part of
the period due in part to lack of fixed
money-inflation or money-income

general public

data with a lag of only twenty-four

Ieaves the choice of another nominal

targeting as a framework of monetary
policy might not be expedient in this

stable relationship between monetary
aggregates and inflation also made it
d ifficult for market participants and the

Electronic
Financial Analysis and Surveillance
System (eFASS) in place, the CBN is
in a position to have banking system

players and the general public may be

thrown into further confusion. This

the

relationships and the low banking
culture in the economy. The lack of a

to the CBN. With the

may
market

nominal anchor of monetary policy in
Nigeria performed better during the

period of market-based system of
monetary control than in the era of
direct control. However, the nominal
target as well as the inflation target

banking system liquidity. The

as

order to ensure the success of
monetary policy. lt is for these
reasons that the use of inflation

that monetary targeting as

instruments and elongation of lending
facility from over-night to 365 days.
This became necessary in thewake of
credit crunch arising from global
flnancial crisis of 2007/2008 to ensure

complicate matters,

period of macroeconomic stability in

).

The analysis in this paper has shown

Furthermore, the discount window
operation was enlarged to the
expanded discount window (EDW)
with the admission of private sector

economic issues. ln the same vein,

number

of

nominal anchors are

of global financial and
economic meltdown. For maximum
benefit, inflation targeting would
achieve more when the domestic
economy enjoys macroeconomic
stability and the international
period

4.0
As a

PolicyRecommendations

major plank

of

economic

management, monetary policy is very

important in Nigeria as in any other

economy. Equally important is the
stakeholders' understanding of the
nominal anchor employed in order for
the monetary authorities to effectively

communicate with

the market

and
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achieve its mandate. For these
reasons, efficient and effective
communication with the market and

that not all the twenty-four

the public cannot be over-emphasized
wh ichever nominal anchor is

statutorily required. This no doubt

employed. Other issues that are
germane to successful outcome of
monetary policy using monetary
targeting as the nominal anchor and
as the market braces up for inflation
targeting in the future include: data
integrity and currency; effective
surveillance of the banking system;
good corporate governance and risk
management; fiscal and monetary

policy coordination

and

harmonization; and deepening the
banking system.

4.1 Monetary Autho rities'
Communication with the Market

hallmarks of central
banking in modern time is effective

One

of the

communication with the markets and

the general public. The era

of

monetary surprises whereby market
operators keep on guessing on the
possible line of action of the central
bank is over. For a successful conduct
of monetary policy, the market needs
to be constructively engaged on the
monetary authorities' line of action
through appropriate signaling and
information disclosure. The current

practice

of

having seminars,

stakeholders' meetings and press
conferences addressed by the Central
Bank Governor after each MPC
meeting at the head office is

commendable. However, given the
geographical coverage of the country
the sheer size ofthe economy and the
regional differences, communication
should be carried furtherto the market

through regional visits

and
conferences and employment of
market watchers to understand better
local conditions of each region as well

as communicate monetary policy to
the grassroots.

4.2

Data lntegrity and Currency

The reliability and cunency of high

frequency financial

banks
comply with daily rendition of returns
on total assets and liabilities as

constrains the CBN

in

the

assessmenl of liquidity and financial
market conditions; and complicales
decision making on appropriate policy
actions. Availability of financial market
information/data is paramount under

the monetary policy framework
either monetary or

infl

of

ation targeting.

4.3

Fiscal and Monetary Policy
Coordination and Harmonization
Nigeria has witnessed some level of
cooperation between fiscal and
monetary authorities in recent time.
However, the challenge is sustaining

this cooperation through

effective

policy coordination
harmonization

and
to ensure emnomic

management optimization. The era of

is over in most
economically developed countries,
having realized the complementary
nature of the two policies open to
fiscal surprises

government in economic
management. The Nigerian financial
market has come of age to support
government in raising its debt capital

institutionalize

the

zero

4.5

Deepening the Banking

System

The Banking system needs to be
deepened in terms of size of
operation, producuservice availability

in n ov atio n including
development of new financial

and

products suitable to the needs of the

Th is becomes
necessary given the relatively low
level of linkages with the real sectorof
-the economy. While the banking

real economy.

system is growing by leap and
bounds, the real sector is not
receiving adequate attention. Unless
the financial sector nurtures the real
sector, macroeconomic stability may
be a mirage in the medium- to longThe recent development
whereby increasing credit was being
directed to the communications and

term.

oil/gas sectors should be replicated in
the manufacturing and agricultural

sectors of the economy. This is
because the most efficient way of

should be discouraged, while only the
size of deticit that could be supported
by the market is implemented by the
fiscal authorities.

increased production of goods and

4.4

Effective Surveillance of
the Banking System

As the banking system

becomes

sophisticated, the need for putting in
place state of the art supervisory and
monitoring system becomes a pre-

condition

for ensuring financial

of

monetary policy

is

through

services.

4.6

Good Corporate
Governance and
Risk Management

Another challenge that might threaten
the favourable outcome of monetary

policy under any nominal anchor is
lack of good corporate governance
and risk management on the part of

system soundness and stabiliry With
the successful completion of the first

most financial institutions operating in
the country. Although, this ought to be
a thing of the past with equity dilution

must naturally follow. This, as well as

consolidation, the experience of
some banks seem to suggest that

phase of the banking system
consolidation, efiective surveillance

demand{riven financial innovation
taking place on daily basis, call for
capacity building on the part of

monetary policy. The absence of data
especially from DMBs on timely basis

institutions hitherto uncovered must
be brought under the radar to

intervention in the money market and
thus complicate the achievement of
optimum banking system liquidity. A
cursory look at the e-FASS indicated

to

tolerance on policy infraction.

curbing inflation under any framework

monetary policy accommodation

emphasized for the effectiveness of

could make opaque CBN's

time

and other financing needs. Therefore.

u lators and supervisors.
Derivatives and other ban king
prod ucts/services, markets and

and

macroeconomic data cannot be over-

system. This calls for cooperation
among all regulatory institutions in the
Nigerian financial system. This is the

reg

preserve the landscape in which
monetary policy thrives. Effective
surveillance is also necessary to
prevent not only a run on the banks
but also a gridlock of the financial
15

that came with banking

industry

much still need to be desired. With the

migration

to

Risk-Based and

consolidated supervision programme
of the CBN, it is expected that DMBS

would imbibe the culture of selfregulation by putting in place good
corporate governance and limiting
their risk appetite to tolerable level
appropriate to their capital/asset
base. With the listing of most, if not all

the banks on the Nigerian

Stock

will rise to the demands of

good

Exchange, it is expected that DMBS
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corporate governance, transparency
and timely information disclosure

structural and technological changes
in the economy as well as financial
sector innovation have significantly

indispensable to the good health of

weakened the hitherto assumed Jixed

among othe rs, which are
banking institutions in ensuring stable
and sound financial environment.

5.0

money-income or money-inflation
relationships, while the nominal

anchor

is less clear to

market

participants and the general public.

Summary and conclusion

ln this paper, the various nominal
anchors available to a central bank as
well as the conditions under which
each could be optimally utilized were

examined. The performance of
monetary targeting as nominal anchor

in the Central Bank of Nigeria was
found to be mixed with relatively
better outcomes in lhe 2002-2007
period. The development was due to
deployment of ICT and other market
infrastructural development that
facilitated improvement in the interbank money market. Nonetheless,

The monetary authorities' initiatives
on transparency must be

monetary aggregates still has a role
to play in aniving at monetary policy
decisions under most policy regimes
including inflation targeting. For this
reason the cunency and credibility of

monetary, banking, financial and
economic data for the successful
employment of any nominal anchor
cannot be over-emphasized. This
explains why inflation targeting is an

complemented by the efforts of other

information inclusive strategy of
monetary policy conduct, whereby

govemment and financial market

financial variables is considered for

coordination of fiscal and monetary
policies and the commitment of
govemment to non-inflationary fiscal

the stability of the financial system is
central to the conduct of monetary

stakeholders especially the
operators. With appropriate

profile the nominal anchor of
monetary or inflation targeting would

perform better that currently

witnessed. lt must be recognized that

data/information on all economic and
policy optimization. ln the same vein,

policy as the experience of the global
financial and economic crisis of 20072008 had shown, in otherto avertthe

financial system from grinding to a
halt.
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